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Abstract: ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) which was 
declared by al-Baghdādī as an Islamic caliphate (dawlah khi-
lāfah) is not necessarily welcomed by Muslim fundamen-
talists in Indonesia. Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and 
Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), two Muslims funda-
mentalist organization that struggle for Islamic caliphate, 
considers ISIS as deviant and invalid. This article aims to 
discuss the argument surrounding religious foundation of 
Islamic caliphate as believed al-Baghdādī as ISIS master-
mind and the response of Indonesian fundamentalists to it. 
While all Islamic fundamentalism believes that establish-
ment of Islamic caliphate is a religious obligation, they do 
not agree how to implement this obligation. ISIS’s al-
Baghdādī is on the opinion that Islamic caliphate is to be 
implemented with all costs, including using violence and 
military campaign, Indonesian fundamentalists tend to use 
non-violence and dialogue as their strategy instead.  
Keywords: Caliphate, Indonesian fundamentalist groups, 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, ISIS. 
Introduction 
The emergence of Sunnite Islamic fundamentalist group of ISIS 
(Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) under leadership of al-Baghdādī has 
stunned the world, including the Muslims. They wage the armed 
resistance against Iraq and Syria that happen to be controlled by Shiite 
regimes. This sudden and fierce military campaign of ISIS has made 
the two regimes incapable of containing their advance. Piece by piece, 
the territory of Iraq and Syria were captured by ISIS. In this territory, 
al-Baghdādī declared the emergence of al-Dawlah al-Islāmīyah fī ‘Irāq wa 
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al-Shām (The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria).1 As the event unfolded, it 
turned out that ISIS intends to expand its territory. This means further 
threat to Iraq and Syria, the two states suffered from internal political 
and sectarian turmoil, as well as the rest states in the region.  
The ISIS phenomenon then spread to Muslim-populated states in 
other regions, thanks to internet and other media. In Indonesia, since 
August of 2014, the government was made busy in dealing with jihad 
movement that claimed to be affiliated to ISIS.2 In Pasuruan of East 
Java, one person named Salim Mubarok al-Tamimi al-Indonesiy 
claimed to be an army chief of ISIS. Furthermore, an Indonesian 
citizen named Wildan Mukhallad was reported to have died in suicide 
bombing attempt in Iraq. National agency for contra terrorism stated 
that there are 56 Indonesian citizens joining the armed ISIS.3 
This development arouses various reactions and comments from 
the governmet and Muslim groups in Indonesia. The ministry of Law 
and Human Rights denounced the spread of ISIS understanding of 
Islam in Indonesia4 and quickly banned the ISIS in Indonesia since it 
has understood Islam as totality and struggled for Islam with any 
available means including violence and crimes. It wages war not only 
to the rest of Muslims who they think to have deviated from their 
understanding of pristine Islam but also to the West who in many 
cases they consider to have causes bad fate on Muslims worldwide.5 In 
addition to that, the government also banned ISIS because it has 
                                                                
1 See http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negara_Islam_Irak_dan_Syam, accessed on 28 
November 2014.  
2 Kompas, “Dilarang Penyebaran Paham ISIS”, 5 August 2014. 
3 Ansyad Mbai (Head of National Bureau against Terror) states that until 2014 there 
are concentration of terrorist network spread across Indonesia. See Reno Muhammad, 
ISIS: Kebiadaban Konspirasi Global (Jakarta: Noura Books, 2014), p. 63. Compare it with 
Abd. A’la, “Terorisme dan Globalisasi,” in Jahiliyah Kontemporer dan Hegemoni Nalar 
Kekerasan: Merajut Islam Indonesia Membangun Peradaban Dunia (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2014), 
p. 7. 
4 Kompas, “Dilarang”, 5 August 2014. 
5 The decision of the government to combat fundamentalist radicals has not been 
perceived as combatting Muslims, instead it is a combat against terrorists. See Bernard 
Lewis, The Crisis of Islam: (Islam dalam Krisis: Antara Perang Suci dan Teror Kotor), translated 
by Muhammad Harir Muzakki (Surabaya: Jawa Pos Press, 2004), p. 1. Read Z.A. 
Maulani, “Di Balik Isu Terorisme”, in Z.A. Maulani et.al, Islam dan Terorisme: Dari 
Minyak Hingga Hegemoni Amerika (Yogyakarta: Ucy Press, 2005), pp. 68-69. 
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applied a version of Islamic law, especially criminal law, which is not 
suitable to aspiration of majority Muslims in Indonesia.  
On the other hand, however, Indonesia is not sterile from Islamic 
fundamentalism phenomenon. Among Islamic fundamentalism group 
in Indonesia are Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and Majelis Mujahidin 
Indonesia (MMI). For them,6 ISIS should theologically be responded 
because ISIS has claimed that its goal is to establish and Islamic 
caliphate which is also the ultimate goal of HTI.7 That immediate 
answer is that the Islamic caliphate that ISIS is now campaigning is 
substantially contradictory to sharia. Therefore, HTI refuses to ack-
nowledge ISIS as an organization that struggle for the establishment of 
Islamic caliphate.8 
The position of HTI is considered odd because HTI believe that 
the establishment of caliphate is arguably more crucial and ultimate 
than observance of Islamic dogma. For HTI activists, caliphate is the 
ultimate goal.9 This is apparent in every HTI handbooks, indoctri-
nation sessions and seminars. HTI Bulletin also always talks about 
khilāfah Islāmīyah (Islamic caliphate). In all mass rallies arranged by 
HTI, regardless the issue, caliphate is the one and only solution.  
In addition to HTI, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) that 
struggle for Islamic state also considers ISIS’s Islamic caliphate as 
heretical.10 MMI argues that to implement sharia, which is the ultimate 
God’s command, the establishment of an Islamic state is a prerequisite. 
Since the idea of implementing sharia of the main goal of MMI, its 
opposition to ISIS’s caliphate is difficult to understand.  
                                                                
6 Those two groups are labeled as extreme right by the government. Tholhatul Choir 
and Ahwan Fanani (ed.), Islam dalam Berbagai Pembacaan Kontemporer (Yogyakarta: 
Pustaka Pelajar, 2009), p. 431. 
7 According to HTI leadership such as al-Nabhānī and Zallūm, the period between 
Prophet Muhammad SAW in Medina and the demise of ottoman Dinasty in March 
1924 is Islamic caliphate period. See Taqiy al-Dīn al-Nabhānī, al-Ḍawlah al-Islāmīyah 
(Beirut: Dār al-‘Ᾱmmah, 1994), p. 224. Read ‘Abd al-Qadīm Zallūm, Niẓām al-Ḥukm fī 
al-Islām (Beirut: Dār al-‘Ᾱmmah, 1992), p. 87.  
8 http://www.muslimedianews.com/2014/08/tanggapan-gerakan-gerakan-islam-terha-
dap.html, accessed on 18 November 2014.  
9 Ainur Rofiq al-Amin, Membongkar Proyek Khilafah Ala Hizbut Tahrir di Indonesia 
(Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2012), p. 40.  
10 http://nasional.news.viva.co.id/news/read/529558-dua-unsur-sesat-isis-menurut-
majelis-mujahidin-indonesia, accessed on 18 November 2014. 
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This phenomenon shows that caliphate contains conceptual and 
applied problem. This debatable concept of caliphate intensified when 
ISIS caliphate was declared and Indonesian Muslim fundamentalist 
groups oppose it. 
Historical Glance of ISIS Movement 
The emergence of ISIS was triggered by the aggression of the 
United States to Iraq that ended with the fall of Saddam Hussein 
regime in. This event created hatred of many Arab Muslims toward the 
US. On the other hand, this already hateful condition provided fertile 
ground for al-Qaeda network to recruit new followers in Iraq.11 Some 
analysts speculated that al-Baghdādī’s ISIS was one of these al-Qaeda’s 
newly formed cells.12 Hence, after the destruction of al-Qaeda as a 
consolidated group in Afghanistan, many dismissed al-Qaeda. Some 
small active cells that launched terror attacks here and there in the 
conflict areas might had similar patterns to al-Qaeda, but not officially 
affiliated to it.13 
In the violence-invested area of Northern Iraq, the population is 
Sunnite Muslims and Saddam Hussein’s loyalists. Their resistance 
towards the central government is understood as an agenda to return 
the power to the Sunnite Saddam Hussein’s loyalists. This is because 
the reigning regime is Shiite, and the Iraq President, Nūrī al-Mālikī is a 
Shiite. Thus, another dimension of the civil war in Iraq and Syria is the 
repetition of sectarian conflict in Middle East between Sunnite and 
Shiite as it had happened in 2006-2007 which claimed thousands of 
lives.14 
The violence in the 2000s still lingers in Arab minds, be they 
Sunnite or Shiite across the Middle East. For Sunnite, this not so long 
                                                                
11 As’ad Said Ali, Al-Qaeda: Tinjauan Sosial-Politik, Ideologi dan Sepak Terjangnya (Jakarta: 
LP3ES, 2014), p. 328. 
12 http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negara_Islam_Irak_dan_Syam, accessed on 28 
November 2014.  
13 The emergence of al-Tawḥīd wa al-Jihād group in Iraq under leadership of Abū 
Mus‘ab Al-Zarqāwī is thought to have similarity with al-Qaeda although put itself 
under al-Qaeda. See Greg Fealy and Anthony Bubalo, Jejak Kafilah: Pengaruh Radikalisme 
Timur Tengah di Indonesia, translated by Akh. Muzakki (Bandung: Mizan, 2007), pp. 76-
76. Before that, this group is based in Herat, West Afghanistan. Since it considered 
necessary to operate in Iraq, al-Zarqāwī moved to North Iraq. Ali, Al-Qaeda, p. 328. 
14 Aula, “Telah Lahir Negara Khilafah,” in Majalah Nahdlatul Ulama, ed. XXXVI 
(August 2014), p. 45. 
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past failure and current subordination under two Shiite rulers in Iraq 
and Syria might inspire the emergence of another jihadi group who try 
to overturn the history. Thus, islamist groups such as Jamā‘at al-Tawhīd 
wa al-Jihād under leadership of al-Zarqāwī seized the momentum to 
launch his jihad campaign.15 
Although the US successfully assassinated al-Zarqāwī group who 
were actively engage in jihad campaigns since 2005, the resistance from 
militant groups continued in Iraq. After al-Zarqāwī’s assassination, 
Abū Ayyūb al-Masrī resumed the resistance. He, in October 2006, 
declared the establishment of Dawlah Islamīyah fī Irāq or Islamic State of 
Iraq (ISI). In 2007, the 2.250 volunteers from Northern Syria and 
Chechnya under leadership of Abū ‘Umar al-Shishanī joined ISI.16 This 
bolstered the strength of ISI to tremendous extent.  
Meanwhile, on April 19th, 2007, Abū ‘Umar declared the 
establishment of Dawlah Islamīyah fī Irāq or Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). 
This was followed by the announcement of cabinet members 
consisting of 10 persons. Abū ‘Umar was deputy chief in al-Qaeda, 
who in this establishment became the chief commander of ISI. In 
April 2010, both Abū Ayyūb al-Masrī and Abū ‘Umar were killed near 
Tikrit, Iraq. After their death, the ISI leadership was resumed by Abū 
Bakr al-Baghdādī who was sworn to assume the position since May 
15th, 2010.17 
In addition to rebel movement led by al-Baghdādī in Iraq, in last 
decade Sunnite ulama in Iraq is also active in arranging peaceful 
actions demanding equal rights by forming Sunni Ulama Front. The 
Iraqi government did not listen to their demands which create voices 
within the Front to support ISI. Although at the end the Front did not 
officially support ISI, it is publicly known that the Front justified ISI’s 
campaigns simply because it was the only resistance that could bring 
solution in dealing with the fanatic Shiites.18 
From the events that unfolded after the fall of Saddam Hussein, 
many Muslims in the region believe that the US is the most responsible 
one for the cycles of violence. The US has planted time bomb in Iraq, 
                                                                
15 Ali, Al-Qaeda, p. 328. 
16 Ibid., p. 330. 
17 Ibid. 
18 http://www.eramuslim.com/suara-kita/suara-pembaca/menggempur-isis.htm#.V-
Gk43FfXvIU, accessed on 28 November 2014. 
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they say. In the neighboring country of Syria that is ruled by another 
Shiite, the Sunnite uprising began. Sunnite militants rooted in Ḥizb al-
Taḥrīr joined with those Sunnite not satisfying with al-Mālikī. 
However, not all Sunnite groups supported the ISIS declaration, 
because their initial goal is merely criticizing non-accommodation 
policy adopted by al-Mālikī.19 Al-Baghdādī’s ISIS is more appealing 
than al-Qaeda. They valued al-Baghdādī as a brilliant military 
tactician.20 Al-Baghdādī’s personal prowess then unchallenged after his 
success in expanding the territory of Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and 
renamed it as Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL).21 On the other hand, 
ISIS jihadi groups originating from Syria have returned to Syria and 
formed Jabhat al-Nuṣrah with the mission of opposing Bashar Assad.22 
It is on that context that ISIS emerged. ISIS is a logical 
consequence of socio-political instability in the Middle East. Jihad 
campaigns that were deployed were continuation of the ultimate goal 
of Muslim revivalists-fundamentalists in establishing dawlah Islāmīyah 
(Islamic state). ISIS now gradually becomes new emerging force that 
ready to pose resistance on ruling powers in the Middle East that they 
consider incapable of realizing the mission to establish an Islamic state 
and implement sharia comprehensively. Given this goal has been 
shared by many Muslims worldwide, the support for ISIS or at least 
their ultimate goal will, and already spread to Muslim populated 
countries beyond the Middle East, including Indonesia.  
Caliphate as the Ideological Basis of ISIS 
The caliphate that ISIS establishes represents a fundamental 
ideology,23 an ideology that is based on the doctrine that is built upon 
the assumption of pure early period of Islam. Admittedly, this doctrine 
is not new in Islamic political history. The spirit of reform of this 
movement seeks for purity of Islam and idealizes an Islamic political 
                                                                
19 Aula, “Telah Lahir,” p. 45. 
20 http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2014/07/01/118589519/Misi-Berbelok-ISIS-
Tak-Akur-dengan-Al-Qaidah, accessed on 29 November 2014. 
21 Levant is other name for Syam which is composed of Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. 
This declaration consists of statement that Jabhat al-Nuṣrah (JN) is a part of ISIS/ISIL. 
See Ali, Al-Qaeda, p. 330. 
22 Ibid., pp. 338-339. 
23 Read Bagus Takwin, Akar-Akar Ideologi: Pengantar Kajian Konsep Ideologi dari Plato 
Hingga Bourdieu (Yogyakarta: Jalasutra, 2008), pp. 36-38. 
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entity for Muslims based on the political practices of the Prophet 
Muhammad. In al-Baghdādī’s point of view, ISIS is the manifestation 
of ideal Islamic political entity that is directed to work on reforming 
Muslims’ thought and implementing sharia founded upon pristine 
Islamic doctrine. It is the anti-thesis of West-sponsored democracy. 
Like other religious movements that blame on outsider for own 
misfortune, al-Baghdādī believes that Muslims’ current poor condition 
is as a result of colonialism and global capitalism. For that reason, their 
resistance is aimed at neo-liberalism and capitalism of the US. As it has 
been campaigned by Osama bin Laden, this is laid upon the 
assumption rest on early Islamic political practices.24 ISIS militia 
rebelled against al-Mālikī in Iraq dan Assad in Syria because they 
believe that the two regimes are collaborators of the West and 
therefore must be rejected at all cost.25 
This world view actually is rooted in Islamic modern thought that 
has the goal to the glory of early Islam by rejecting innovation in 
religion which is alredy corrupted from its original spirit. They 
denounced the last Islamic Caliphate of Ottoman because it had 
deviated from their version of pure Islam. Thus, they intend to create 
own caliphate.26 
This reform of Muslim thought is an effort to deal with the 
backwardness and poverty of muslim world as well as to provide 
roadmap for Muslims to return to pristine teaching of Islam. This 
movement had been flourished in the second part of IX century CE. 
The main mastermind was Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, Muḥammad 
‘Abduh, and Rashīd Riḍā. Later, Ḥasan al-Bannā’ and Sayyid Quṭb 
were highly responsible for al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn’s ideology. The 
thought the last two personalities were dyed with anti-West 
sentiment.27 
Ideology speaking, ISIS phenomenon has similarities with al-
Ikhwān al-Muslimūn that deeply involved in the political turmoil in 
                                                                
24 Ali, Al-Qaeda, pp. 16-17. 
25 http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negara_Islam_Irak_dan_Syam, accessed on 28 
November 2014. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ḥasan al-Bannā’ (1906-1949 M) was a charismatic and influential Egyptian Muslim 
who found al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn 1928 di Ismailiyah, southeastof Cairo, Egypt. His 
movement spread in Muslim world. See Anouar Abdel-Malek (ed.), Contemporary Arab 
Political Thought (Bath: The Pitman Press, 1980), p. 45. 
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Egypt since the latter opposed the British occupation and the creation 
of Israel on Palestinians‘ land.28 Al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn believed that 
the political establishment that founded upon Arab nationalism had 
failed, because it blatantly imitated European countries which had 
separated religion and politics. For al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn, the West 
did not provide enough space for Christianity to regulate profane 
affairs, whereas in al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn’s mind, the ideology of 
Islam could not be realized if not applied as the rule for all aspects of 
life. It meant creating regulation based on Islam for all human affairs.29 
In the discipline of fiqh siyāsah (Islamic political science), the 
thought of al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn is frequently referred as the pattern 
for contemporary Islamic fundamentalism movement in Muslim 
world,30 including ISIS. As other fundamentalism movement, al-
Baghdādī’s followers intend to establish Islamic state and apply sharia 
for that state. To achieve this goal, they refuse to make dialogue and 
other peaceful means, except with those who agreed with their goals 
and swear to be loyal with ISIS caliphate with bay‘ah. As a result, their 
only means is violence and terror which they call jihad.31 
Under the banner of jihad, this militias under the command of al-
Baghdādī marched force fully to fight the Iraqi and Syrian regimes 
whom they consider not applying sharia. After those militias captured 
some areas from Iraq and Syria, they declared ISIS and appied strict 
sharia, notably Islamic criminal law along with its hand amputation for 
thieves, stoning for adulterers, and crucifying those who not 
performed Ramadan fasting.32 They consider their approach as the 
only true in applying Islam. Other Muslims who do not agree and 
                                                                
28 In the 1940s, al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn aunched series of violent attacks targeting the 
government facilities. As a result, King Farooq of Egypt banned its activities in 1948. 
Al-Ikhwān Muslimūn’s goal was to establish Islamic state in Egypt. See Munawir 
Sjadzali, Islam dan Tata Negara: Ajaran, Sejarah dan Pemikiran (Jakarta: UI-Press, 1993), p. 
145. 
29 M. Imdadun Rahmat, Arus Baru Islam Radikal: Transmisi Revivalisme Islam Timur Tengah 
ke Indonesia (Jakarta: Erlangga, 2007), p. 46. 
30 Azyumardi Azra, Pergerakan Politik Islam: Dari Fundamentalisme, Modernisme Hingga Post-
Modernisme (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1996), p. 115. 
31 Read Zulfi Mubaraq, Tafsir Jihad:Menyingkap Tabir Fenomena Terorisme Global (Malang: 
UIN-Maliki Press, 2011), p. 90. 
32 Read Reno Muhammad, ISIS: Kebiadaban Konspirasi Global (Jakarta: Noura Books, 
2014), p. 48.  
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oppose ISIS are considered infidels and apostates.33 ISIS caliphate 
stresses that after it has been declared, the only obligation for Muslims 
is to swear the loyalty and obey.34 
ISIS believe that only rightful authority can wage and lead jihad 
and the first thing of jihad is waging war against non-Muslim states to 
purify Islam. Other muslim resistance groups are considered 
unauthorized representation of Islam. For ISIS, HAMAS of Palestine 
are apostate and have no right in waging war against Israel.35 Too, ISIS 
attacked Shiite sects, Yazidi minorities, Kurds, and certainly non-
Muslim in the nearby areas. Those other Muslim groups are forced to 
pay obedience to ISIS, whereas non-Muslims are given the choice of 
converting to Islam, paying tax, or leaving the territory occupied by 
ISIS and give all properties to ISIS.36 
Simplistically speaking, ISIS is a true manifestation of caliphate 
that represents a political ideology that concerns with Islamic 
fundamentalism agenda. However, it can not be considered as political 
institution. At least, ISIS phenomenon reflects caliphate institution that 
had been dreamed by those extreme fundamentalists. ISIS constructs 
the Islamic political heritage into reality. As an Islamic caliphate, they 
also use jihad to justify violence, killing and war to implement sharia. 
Predictably, ISIS’s caliphate is not warmly welcomed by the rest 
Islamic fundamentalist groups for some reasons. Initially, those groups 
speak about normative aspects about caliphate, but at the end, it is 
obvious that the talk is about political contestation with various 
interests and goals.37 
                                                                
33 http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negara_Islam_Irak_dan_Syam, accessed on 28 
November 2014. Al-Baghdādī claimed that Muslim youths have the aspiration to 
establish Islamic state in form of caliphate since they consider caliphate the ideal form 
of Islamic state.  
34 http://heniputra.my.id/isis-jatuh-ke-dalam-perangkap-deklarasi-khilafah-yang-tidak-
akan-merubahnya-dari-sebuah-kelompok, accessed on 28 November 2014. 
35 http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negara_Islam_Irak_dan_Syam, accessed on 28 
November 2014. 
36 Muhammad, ISIS, pp. 49-53. 
37 When ISIS declared its caliphate, it recited the Quran (24:55 and 61:4) which contain 
the promise of God Almighty for the believers and those who do good deeds. The 
Quran (61:4) is verse contain the injunction to do jihad. HTI justify the obligation of 
establishing caliphate on the Holy Quran (5:48-49) which oblige Muslims to use God’s 
law to regulate life. This verse necessitates God’s law guardian, who in HTI 
understanding is a caliph. Fundamentalist Muslims also often cite several verses of the 
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From the perspective of Islamic political science, there are some 
theoretical frameworks concerning caliphate. Among the earliest is Ibn 
Taymīyah who expresses his reservation about caliphate even though 
there are several textual references in the Holy Quran. This reference 
concerns the concept of governance, authority, and umma.38 Still, Ibn 
Taymīyah does not deny the importance of government, but he relates 
it with the conception of human as political being shaped by history.39 
Thus, from the perspective of Islamic political sciences, governance in 
this sense is more historical and the product of tradition, not textual 
reference as believed by ISIS.  
Based on this point of view, caliphate is a concept that emerges 
from Islamic political tradition. Thoha Hamim also acknowledged this 
point. He argues that caliphate concept is not laid upon strong and 
conclusive textual foundation. There is no template of caliphate system 
that can be applied universally across time and space (one size fits for 
all). The Holy Quran and prophet tradition do not determine system 
and form of caliphate institution, let alone the organizational structure 
and philosophical underpinnings. Since the period of the Prophet 
Muhammad, Muslim community had been living under political entity 
with various naming and features.40 Thus, caliphate is a historical 
property, not sharia. 
Some Muslim intellectuals try to prove that the first and second 
Bay‘at al-‘Aqabah, the agreement between the Prophet with the 
Madinah’s representative of ‘Aws and Khazraj clans, was the first 
cornerstone of Islamic polity.41 Yet, the Islamic polity is oriented in the 
                                                                                                                                      
Holy Quran (4:58, 59, and 65), (5: 103), and (23:51). In addition, there are also several 
verses they cite. Medieval Muslim scholars Ibn Abī Rabī‘ Ulama cited (6:165) and (4: 
59), Ibn Taymīyah cited (4: 58-59). However, those verses do not specifically speak 
about caliphate and political establishment. 
38 Ibn Taymīyah, Minhāj al-Sunnah (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub, n.d.), pp. 2-3. 
39 Khalid Ibrahim Jindan, Teori Politik Islam: Telaah Kritis Ibnu Taimiyah Tentang 
Pemerintahan Islam (Surabaya: Risalah Gusti, 1999), pp. 40-41.  
40 Thoha Hamim, Islam dan NU di Bawah Tekanan Problematika Kontemporer: Dialektika 
Kehidupan Politik, Agama, Pendidikan dan Sosial Masyarakat Muslim (Surabaya: Diantama, 
2004), p. 7. 
41 According to Rais, the two Bay‘at al-‘Aqabah were similar to social contract that was 
conceptualized by some modern political philosophers and considered as foundation 
for the establishment of nation state and government. See M. Dhiauddin Rais, Teori 
Politik Islam, translated by Abdul Hayyie al-Kattani (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 2001), 
p. 7. 
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chiefdom of Madinah, not khilāfah. Bay‘at al-‘Aqabah, this agreement is 
considered an important feature in Islamic political sciences.42 
This classic evidence shows that caliphate in Islamic political 
sciences do not have normative reference, since it evolved43 and 
manifested in various forms and concept. Forms and criteria of 
caliphate, indeed, emerge from history. Based on this understanding, it 
can be understood that caliphate is social institution that functions as a 
changeable institution following social change across time and space. 
By analyzing caliphate history, establishing caliphate that is not deeply 
rooted in current reality is contradictory to the very feature of caliphate 
as social institution.  
HTI and MMI, The Islamic Fundamentalist Movement in 
Indonesia 
Many observers categorize Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and 
Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) as Muslim fundamentalist groups. 
This is understandable since according to William Montgomery Watt 
religious fundamentalism is an English term to signify Protestants who 
believe that the Bible should be accepted and interpreted literally.44 
Thus, in the context of Islamic movement, groups who accept the 
message of the Holy Quran literally, although only for some select 
verses, might be related to the term of considered fundamentalists. 
HTI and MMI has aired the discourse of and campaigned for the 
implementation state-level of sharia comprehensively. So, the two 
groups can be considered of having literalistic interpretation and bear 
the name of fundamentalism.  
HTI predictable is affiliated to Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr established in 1953 by 
Taqiy al-Nabhānī (1909-1979) in al-Quds Palestina.45 The activities of 
                                                                
42 Muḥammad Yūsuf Mūsā, Niẓām al-Ḥukm fī al-Islām (al-Qāhirah: Dār al-Kitāb al-
‘Arabī, 1963), p. 20. See ‘Abd al-Qādir Zaydan, al-Farḍ wa al-Dawlah fī al-Sharī‘ah al-
Islāmīyah (al-Ijtihād al-Islāmi al-‘Alamī, 1970), p. 13. 
43 This change affirms the opinion that caliphate is an ever-changing institution since it 
is a social institution. This can be viewed from different attributes of the caliphs, 
namely khalīfat al-Rasūl, amīr al-mu’minīn, sulṭān, shah, prime minister, president in in 
different time and space. These attributes do not mean subordinate to caliph, instead, 
they have connotative meaning of symbolic authority. Bernard Lewis, Political Language 
of Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 51. 
44 William Montgomery Watt, Fundamentalisme Islam dan Modernitas, translated by Taufik 
Adnan Amal (Jakarta: RajaGrafindo, 2001), pp. 3-4. 
45 al-Amin, Membongkar, p. 21. 
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this HTI is Islamic politics and ideology. HTI officially declared its 
existence in Indonesia by holding an international conference in 
national stadium of Senayan.46 HTI utilizes internet in campaigning its 
Islamic ideology in Indonesia and in communicating with its head 
quarter in Jordan. This last point serves HTI as a method for updating 
information, thought, ideas and latest ideological discourse in Ḥizb al-
Taḥrīr worldwide, but especially of the Middle East.47 
The discourse that HTI builds is that Muslim life in Indonesia is 
not Islamic because the political and legal frameworks are not Islamic. 
Indonesian legal system is based on Dutch legal system on which HTI 
considers secular and therefore not Islamic. This not Islamic system 
has contributed to poor condition of social condition in Indonesia. So 
many breaches of law are not punished.48 To HTI, this signifies the 
incapability of the current not Islamic legal system. The only cure is by 
replacing the current legal system with Islamic legal system.49 
HTI only acknowledges the only authority of God’s law and fights 
for its comprehensive implementation to include both private and 
public aspects of law. This is as a sign of Muslims’ total obedience to 
Islam. To realize this ideal legal system, HTI proposes Islamic cali-
phate. Thus, HTI calls for the return to the pure teaching of Islam.50 
Apart from HTI, there is Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI). 
MMI is an Indonesian Islamic movement organization that is actively 
campaigning for the implementation of sharia within the existing 
political arrangement. MMI was declared on 7th of August 2000 in a 
conference called mujahidin congress. This conference was held to 
respond unfavorable policies of the Old Order and New Order 
regimes that had curtailed Muslims’ interest in Indonesia. for MMI, 
Muslims in Indonesia are in the state of back wardness since the 
independence of Indonesia in 1945. The only solution of this back 
wardness is the implementation of their version of sharia.51 Sharia, in 
                                                                
46 Afdlal et.al, Islam dan Radikalisme di Indonesia (Jakarta: LIPI Press, 2005), pp. 265-266. 
47 Rahmat, Arus, p. 78. 
48 Afdlal et.al, Islam, p. 269. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid., pp. 269-272. 
51 Abdul Aziz, Politik Fundamentalis: Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia dan Cita-cita Penegakan 
Syari‘at Islam (Yogyakarta: Institute of International Studies, 2011), pp. 85, 92, and p. 
100. 
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MMI understanding is based on normative and textual reading of the 
Holy Qur’an and Prophet tradition.  
The goal of MMI establishment as revealed in its Yogyakarta 
Pledge is five folds. The first is the obligation of Muslims to observe 
sharia. The second is opposition to any other ideologies that are 
contradictory to Islamic teaching, since it will result in idolatry and 
hypocrisy, as well as will result in violating human rights. The third is 
building a strong front of mujahidin, in local, national and international 
levels. The fourth is to establish an imāmah (khilāfah) or Islamic political 
leadership worldwide. The fifth is to call for the intensification of 
Islamic da‘wa and jihad to realize Islam as raḥmah li al-‘ālamīn (blessing 
for mankind).52 
The essence of these five mission statements is the idea of 
implementing sharia by the state and establishing Islamic caliphate. 
According to Abdul Aziz, the desire to estanlish Islamic state is the 
prerequisite of the implementation of sharia. MMI formulated this idea 
by referring to the efforts conducted by several Indonesian Muslim 
hardliners of Negara Islam Indonesia (NII).53 However, given the 
different context and resources, MMI tend to be more lenient in term 
of absence of military options. Considering its ultimate goal to 
establish Islamic state in Indonesia, many MMI sympathizers hope that 
MMI will become the true successor of NII.54 
After describing HTI and MMI in detail, it is safe to say that both 
HTI and MMI have the inspiration to implement sharia and to 
establish Islamic caliphate to safeguard the implementation of sharia. 
These two organizations are campaigning for the pure Islam and 
exclusive in responding other understanding of Islam. This attitude 
arguably is originated in their scriptural and literal reading to the Holy 
Quran and Prophet tradition.  
Responses of Indonesian Muslim Fundamentalists on ISIS’ 
Caliphate Claim 
After the demise of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, many Muslims 
believe that the next step is reconciliation and rehabilitation of all 
                                                                
52 Taufik Adnan Amal and Samsu Rizal Panggabean, Politik Syari’at Islam: Dari Indonesia 
Hingga Nigeria (Jakarta: Pustaka Alvabet, 2004), p. 77. 
53 Aziz, Politik, p. 100. 
54 Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni, Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia (Jakarta: RajaGrafindo 
Persada, 2004), p. 48. 
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aspect of life. However, the succeeding leadership under prime 
minister Nūrī al-Mālikī has failed to do this. Corruption in his 
administration and the conflict between the ruling Shiite and Sunnite 
increasingly escalate. Sunnite who are excluded from the existing 
political arrangement feel that they are treated unfairly. This helps the 
increase of ISIS popularity among Iraqi Sunnite Muslims.   
Banking on that context, Sunnite Muslims are divided whether to 
support or oppose ISIS. Several Sunnite clerics blatantly oppose ISIS, 
such as Adnan al-Aroor and Abu Basir al-Tartusi even call ISIS as 
terrorists and do not represent Sunnism. The accuse ISIS as Khawarij 
and anti-Islam.55 Worldwide Muslim cleric association (IUMS) led by 
well-known Egyptian Yūsuf al-Qarḍāwī56 also issue a fatwa (non-
binding opinion) stating that ISIS declaration of caliphate as not valid 
from the perspective of sharia.57 
Not only moderate Muslims who oppose ISIS, the opposition to 
ISIS is also expressed by Muslim fundamentalist groups in Indonesia. 
HTI responds ISIS declaration of caliphate as not valid because it did 
not meet four requirements. The first is that ISIS does not have 
autonomous territory. The current occupied territory of ISIS is still 
legally belongs to Iraq and Syria. In addition, the territory is occupied 
by force, so that it does not belong to ISIS de jure. The second, and 
still related to the first, is that Iraq and Syria as the rightful owner of 
territory still demand the territory to be returned to them and do so by 
force. Thus, ISIS can not guarantee the security of Muslims living in 
that territory. The third is that ISIS is unable to implement sharia 
comprehensively (kāffah). The fourth is that a caliphate should be led 
by a caliph who is a Muslim, adult, male, freeman, sane, capable and 
just.58 
                                                                
55 http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negara_Islam_Irak_dan_Syam, accessed on 28 
November 2014. 
56 According to Fealy and Bubalo, al-Qarḍāwī is influential Muslim scholar with far 
reaching audience. His ideas are broad, topical, contemporary, and easy reading. Al-
Qarḍāwī’s ideas are often referred to by Muslim activists. See Fealy and Bubalo, Jejak, 
p. 66.  
57 http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negara_Islam_Irak_dan_Syam, Accessed on 28 
November 2014. 
58 http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/2014/08/06/jubir-hti-pemerintah-harus-sikapi-isis-dan-
khilafah-secara-proporsional/, accessed on 29 November 2014. 
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Ismail Yusanto, the spokesperson of HTI, stated that ISIS never 
showcases its concept of sharia in the aspects of politics, economy, 
legal, and the rest of sharia aspects.59 So, it is hard to determine the 
soundness of ISIS’s sharia. In addition, ISIS caliphate remains hidden 
even though it has declared its existence in 2007. This mechanism 
contradicts the practice that had been laid down by the prophet 
Muhammad in Madinah caliphate. Moreover, HTI insists that caliphate 
should be achieved by peace and da‘wa, not by force as ISIS has 
done.60 ISIS’ caliphate is a distortion of the true meaning of caliphate 
and excludes the rest of Muslims who oppose it. Thus, HTI considers 
that ISIS’s caliphate is illegitimate. 
Similar to HTI’s point of view, MMI also considers ISIS’s caliphate 
as illegitimate. Muhammad Thalib, a leader of MMI, says that ISIS has 
spread lies under the name of caliphate. The appointment of al-
Baghdādī as caliph was not conducted in procedural way and this can 
trigger conflict among Muslims. In addition, ISIS considers other 
Muslims who oppose its caliphate as infidels. MMI is on the position 
that whoever calls Muslims to approve him as caliph without 
mushāwarah (consultation), as al-Baghdādī did, is heretic.61 
The opposition of HTI and MMI toward al-Baghdādī’s declaration 
as caliph does not necessarily means that the two groups differ 
significantly to ISIS. In fact, HTI, MMI and ISIS share ideological 
features in many respects, but differ in term of method and strategy. 
For a start, HTI and MMI do not use force and military campaign in 
their activity. Instead, they employ persuasive approach. To make 
things more complicated, there are sharp difference as well between 
MMI and HTI. MMI tends to engage in academic and political 
discourse. Its main priority is implementation of sharia and the 
emphasis of the establishment of caliphate comes second. MMI asserts 
that sharia will be well-implemented by the state when three features 
are realized. The first is that Muslim leadership of the country must be 
assumed by Muslims who are committed to the implementation of 
sharia. The second is that state policy must always correspond with 
                                                                
59 http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/2014/08/12/hti-isis-tak-penuhi-kriteria-syari’at-dirikan-
khilafah, accessed on 29 November 2014. 
60 http://www.muslimedianews.com/2014/08/tanggapan-gerakan-gerakan-islam-ter-
hadap.html, accessed on 29 September 2014. 
61 http://nasional.news.viva.co.id/news/read/529558-dua-unsur-sesat-isis-menurut-
majelis-mujahidin-indonesia, accessed on 16 August 2014. 
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sharia. The third is the presumed creation of Islamic civilization laid 
upon Islamic theology. It can be summed up that MMI’s main goal is 
comprehensive implementation of sharia. MMI believes that 
implementation of sharia will likely to be achieved using bottom-up 
strategy with the ultimate implementation of sharia in national level at 
the end.62 
In contrast to MMI, HTI opposition to ISIS is more political in 
nature.63 HTI believes that ISIS was born from internal conflict 
between Sunnite and Shiite in Iraq with the final objective of taking 
over the power from the al-Mālikī’s Shiite regime. This Shiite regime 
had taken over the power with the help of the United States and its 
allies.64 The leadership and membership ISIS are those of Saddam 
Hussein loyalists. Thus, from HTI’s perspective, ISIS is merely a 
political vehicle of those loyalists and abuse the term of caliphate as 
political commodity.  
Caliphate in the Perspective of HTI, MMI, and ISIS 
The main goal of ISIS’ caliphate is the creation of political 
authority to implement sharia in all aspects of Muslims life. In this 
sense, all Indonesian fundamentalist groups, including HTI and MMI, 
approve, because this is also their main ideological goal. However, HTI 
and MMI disapprove ISIS simply because of ISIS’ method and 
strategy. HTI and MMI oppose ISIS’ brute violence and militaristic 
strategy because caliphate must be founded with peace and 
negotiation.  
Many Indonesian Muslim intellectuals has been aware of the 
contemporary fundamentalist movements in Indonesia. Ali Maschan 
Moesa, a Muslim intellectual from Nahdlatul Ulama, for instance, 
asserts that Islamic fundamentalism understand the religion as 
universal. This in the past was known as pan-Islamism. The main 
                                                                
62 Aziz, Politik, p. 177 and p. 191. 
63 The opposition of HTI and MMI to ISIS cannot be generalized to groups affiliated 
to Shiite. Groups such as Ḥizb al-Da‘wah al-Islāmīyah and other movements affiliated to 
it in the Middle East, Jihād al-Islām and ‘Amal al-Islam in South Lebanon, including Ḥizb 
Allāh is the supporters of Shiite revolutionary movement who was mobilized by 
Islamic Republic of Iran founded on theological philosophy of Ayatullah Khomaini’s 
wilāyat al-faqīh. See Shireen T. Hunter, Politik Kebangkitan Islam Keragaman dan Kesatuan, 
translated by Ajat Sudrajat (Yogyakarta: Tiara Wacana, 2001), p. 18.  
64 http://www.republika.co.id/berita/internasional/timur-tengah/14/08/05/n9so29-
benarkah-isis-ingin-mewujudkan-khilafah, accessed on 29 November 2014. 
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feature of this movement is its desire to implement sharia interpreted 
from the sacred texts in textual-normative and scripturalistic.65 In this 
interpretation, sharia should be implemented comprehensively, not 
partially. Any contradicting values and culture is rejected under the 
pretext of against the sharia. In term of strategy and method, Oliver 
Roy divides the Muslim fundamentalists into two types, namely 
evolutionists and reformists (reformists). According to revolutionists, 
the islamization of the umma (Muslim community), must be done by 
firstly taking over the power. This group choose non-cooperative 
measure and refuses democracy which they consider not Islamic. ISIS 
falls into this category, since it uses force. Internally, al-Baghdādī’s ISIS 
fights against the authority of Iraq and Syria whom it considers 
infidels. In global level, ISIS challenges the domination of the Unites 
States whom it considers to be held responsible for Iraq’s political 
turmoil.66 
On the other hand, evolutionist model believes that their social 
and political actions are aimed at re-islamizing the umma from bottom 
and moving up to establish an Islamic state.67 Indonesian 
fundamentalist groups of HTI and MMI are included into this 
category. They do not have the plot to topple down the power and do 
not consider the existing political arrangements are infidel, although 
they also wish that the global US domination must end. They 
campaign for the implementation of sharia and the establishment of 
caliphate in transformative manner. Thus, the opposition of HTI and 
MMI to ISIS’ caliphate is a question of the means and method of how 
to get the power and how to implement sharia. It is the question 
whether violence, political opposition, collaboration or political 
disengagement should be deployed as strategy. The fact shows that 
when ISIS proclaimed   the caliphate for a second time on June 29th, 
2014, HTI and MMI opposed it and certainly disagreed with the ISIS’ 
                                                                
65 Ali Maschan Moesa, Nasionalisme Kiai: Konstruksi Sosial Berbasis Agama (Yogyakarta: 
LKiS, 2007), pp. 278-295. 
66 Sunnite fundamentalist groups who choose to revolutionary model are represented 
by Tanẓīm al-Qā’idah led by Usama bin Laden and its network, Abū Mus‘ab al-Zarqāwī 
‘s group in Iraq, al-Jamā‘ah Islāmīyah in Southeast Asia and Juma Namangani movement 
in ex-soviet countries in Central Asia. See Rahmat, Arus, p. 18.  
67 Oliver Roy, Gagalnya Politik Islam, translated by Harimurti and Qomaruddin SF 
(Jakarta: Serambi, 1996), p. 29. 
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violence.68 This means they are evolutionists (reformists), clearly in the 
opposite of ISIS. 
ISIS revolutionary movement aims at establishing caliphate and 
forcefully implementing sharia. This model of caliphate is different 
from the model that HTI and MMI use. Even though ISIS has 
successfully established a de facto caliphate along with caliph, territory, 
umma (citizens), governance arrangement, armed forces, public 
administration, and income resources, HTI and MMI opposed ISIS 
caliphate.  
The reason of HTI should also be understood by observing the 
fact that caliphate of ISIS does not fit the criteria that HTI has 
outlined. The trend and interest of HTI politics should be fully 
comprehend. The opposition of HTI to ISIS caliphate does not 
concern the principles, which they both share, but it relates to detail 
issues or the adoption of different strategies. MMI also oppose ISIS of 
this unsubstantial ground. They consider ISIS as heretical simply 
because ISIS applied violence means in realizing its caliphate.  
Regardless the difference in methods and means, contemporary 
Muslim fundamentalists have the aspiration to establish caliphate. This 
aspiration is originally inspired by the reform of Afghānī, ‘Abduh, 
Riḍā, and Sayyid Quṭb in the Nineteenth Century CE. Afghānī was 
known as salafī leader who direcly involved in international movement 
against West colonialism and imperialesim in Muslim world.69 He was 
known as reformist rather that political and cultural activist. Afghānī 
uses religious injunctions for reform and believes that the glory of 
Islam can be revived by returning to the basic teaching of Islam that 
was applied by early Muslims (al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ).70. 
The mission of Afghānī later was carried out by ‘Abduh71 and 
Riḍā. Riḍā believes that Islam is a comprehensive religion and provides 
all necessary teachings for Muslims, including political, economy and 
                                                                
68 Aula, Telah Lahir, p. 45. 
69 Sadzali, Islam, pp. 116-117.  
70 The idea of salafīyah was not originally from Afghānī because there was IbnTaymīyah 
and Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Waḥḥāb who respectively in XII and XVIII CE spoke the 
similar ideas. See Sadzali, Islam, pp. 124-125.  
71 After graduated from al-Azhar University, Abduh taught in Dār al-‘Ulūm school in 
Egypt. Then he met Afghānī and formed a solidarity organization called al-Urwah al-
Wuthqā (1884). See Abdel-Malek (ed), Contemporary, p. 39. 
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social systems. To reclaim the glorious past, Muslims must not imitate 
the West. Riḍā’s conviction influence Ḥasan al-Bannā’ dearly, whose 
al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn had very negative tone for the West.72 
Similar to Ḥasan al-Bannā’, Sayyid Quṭb as his successor was a 
sheer thinker. He outlines three thoughts that became the concept of 
caliphate for contemporary fundamentalist movements. The first is the 
creation a Pan-Islam and centralistic government across the current 
political boundary. The second is equal rights for all citizens regardless 
different religious backgrounds in which Islam guarantee the 
protection and safety for non-Muslims living within its boundary to 
observe religion. It also will guarantee equality among citizens and aims 
at realizing humanism and freedom of religion. The last is justice, 
people obedience and consultation.73 
The aforementioned thoughts of salafī thinkers become the 
ideology of Sunnite fundamentalist movements, notably al-Ikhwān al-
Muslimūn, regardless revolutionary or transformative. They bring salafī 
mission of the comprehensiveness of Islamic teaching, application of 
sharia, purification, and caliphate. After them, there were ‘Abd al-A‘lā 
al-Mawdūdī, Taqiy al-Dīn al-Nabhānī, Yūsuf al-Qarḍāwī, and other 
salafī thinkers. Special account must be attributed to Afghānī who first 
set the principles of movement and adopted revolutionary approach. 
After him, there are in contrast, ‘Abduh and Riḍā were keen to use 
reform and transformation. In this context, ISIS is more likely to adopt 
Afghānī, whereas HTI and MMI are closer to, mainly, Riḍā who 
inclined to use transformative approach. 
Broadly speaking, Muslim fundamentalist movements that have 
transformative approach in Indonesia tend to align their agenda with 
the existing context by accepting Indonesia’s political arrangement 
albeit reluctantly. Yet, some small groups categorically do not accept 
the state ideology and create tension here and there. They accept 
democracy as a means to achieve their ultimate goal. Whereas ISIS, it 
refuses all modern system, including democracy, constitution and 
nation state. ISIS put Islam as state ideology and official state religion. 
It launches jihad campaign to take over the power by all forms of 
                                                                
72 Lihat Sadzali, Islam, pp. 145, 147. Read Abdel-Malek (ed.), Contemporary, p. 45. 
73 Ibid. 
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force, including open warfare. It is clearly revolutionary to the 
extreme.74 
Admittedly, ISIS in one side and HTI and MMI on the other side 
have identical underlying principles and goals, notably the 
establishment of caliphate. The difference lies only in their strategies in 
facing social and political situation. While Indonesian fundamentalist 
groups of HTI and MMI adopt the transformative approach with 
structural transition process, ISIS is revolutionary with the immediate 
intention of taking over the power. While HTI and MMI use gradual 
campaign and realistic in assessing the condition before jumping into 
establishing caliphate, ISIS tends to seize the moment to establish its 
version of ideal caliphate albeit on unfertile ground.  
Conclusion  
The campaign of al-Baghdādī principally is identical to those other 
fundamentalist groups in general. They all are on the conviction that 
when caliphate is established, sharia will be comprehensively 
applicable. They all are on the opinion that caliphate has conclusive 
normative textual foundation. As a result, the establishment of 
caliphate is a necessity. In bold and violent measure, and seizing the 
turmoil momentum in the region, al-Baghdādī established ISIS, Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria.  
Indonesian Muslim fundamentalist groups such as HTI and MMI 
opposed ISIS’ caliphate claim. This opposition does not concern with 
the main concept, principles and objective of an Islamic caliphate. 
Instead, their opposition lies upon different type of modes of realizing 
their goal. While al-Baghdādī establishes ISIS using revolution and 
force, Indonesian fundamentalist groups adopt peaceful and trans-
formative da‘wa (evolution).  
Normatively speaking, the obligation to establish caliphate is 
unfounded in Islam. Instead, caliphate was deployed as a political 
institution, but never in vacuum. Thus, caliphate was subject of change 
and modification. Caliphate emerged from Muslim social impro-
visation that evolved in time and space. Therefore, modern political 
arrangements that have similar feature to caliphate should be 
                                                                
74 In contemporary Shiite context, the Islamic Republic of Iran with the ideology of 
Islam wilāyat al-faqīh can be categorized revolutionary fundamentalist. It applied 
literalistic Islamic law that includes stoning for adulterers. Haideh Moghissi, Feminisme 
dan Fundamentalisme Islam, translated by M. Maufur (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2004), p. 133.  
  205 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 08, Number 02, December 2014 
Indonesian Fundamentalist Groups  
considered valid. Publicly elected leadership is acceptable as the 
rightful authority because public consensus is legally binding in Islam.[] 
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